Experiential Freedom and Kantian Autonomy

Introduction

It is not clear what implications a metaphysically determined will would have for Kant’s constructive conception of autonomy. It is even less clear what the consensus is, or should be, as to what metaphysical free will actually is (or is not). Kant seems committed to saying that the will is nothing more than practical reason, and that it is free insofar as it is not determined by external (heteronomous) forces. In this sense, regardless of any ultimate metaphysical conception of free will, the will can be considered free without controversy. Or can it?

In this paper I will argue that Kant’s conception of autonomy can stand apart, in its own conceptual domain, from a richer metaphysical conception of autonomy (or free will). I will also argue, however, that whether we are free in a deep and crucial sense is fundamental not only to Kant’s moral project but to any moral project. Whether our choices are merely causally (or otherwise) determined events has serious implications for our conception of morality and, by extension, for the depths of our social and political lives.

I seek to outline a larger project by making two main points: (1) that what I will call experiential freedom is the basis for establishing moral accountability; and (2) that experiential freedom is compatible with a determined will.

Freedom and Kantian Autonomy

In the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant argues that a concept like freedom is necessary to explain autonomy of the will (Kant 1785, 4:446). He states that the will is, in effect, a “causality of rational beings.” In other words, the effects of the will are caused by the will itself—internally—and not by “alien” causes (Kant 1785, 4:446). Kant holds that we cannot infer knowledge of this freedom, ascertain it by experience, or prove it by empirical means. Furthermore, he argues that the will is unique to rational beings (human beings as the paradigm example, though not necessarily the only ones).

This idea contrasts with natural necessity, the outcome of causal, heteronomous determinism. Under natural necessity, an effect is utterly determined by an external cause. Since this is not true of the will, the will is not bound to natural necessity. If it is free, it is free because it is bound only by itself, reflexively. Kant thus grounds the will as free in a negative sense: freedom of the will means that the will is not bound by external factors. This is a compelling argument, since that which is “unbound” must at least be free in some way—or at least freer than it otherwise would be.

This is not to say that the will cannot be influenced by external events. Kant would grant that it can be, and that it can be influenced to various degrees, even extreme ones. He would stop short of saying that the will could be completely determined by external forces. In this sense it is difficult to disagree. If the will could be utterly determined by things outside it, it would make little sense to speak of a “will” in the first place. A will simply determined by external factors would be nothing more than a product of natural necessity—an idea Kant’s argument for autonomy is meant to rule out.

Freedom as an Experience of Rational Agents

A large part of what makes freedom significant is the feeling of liberty itself: the way it feels to be free, or even the way it feels to feel free. That rational agents, as experiencers, can deliberate inwardly among reasons to act and can understand that they are doing so seems significant, to say the least. I will call this phenomenon experiential freedom. Experiential freedom, as I define it, is the phenomenon of being self-aware of one’s own will. I want to state briefly why this is relevant.

If the will is bound only to itself, then it is autonomous. Yet if the will is bound—even to itself as a reflexive causality—it is still, in some way, not free. Kant does not address this problem sufficiently. He can be read as taking autonomy of the will as evidence for freedom of the will, but it is not clear that this follows.

Taking ourselves as experiencers allows us to engage freedom differently. Understanding freedom as an experience, rather than merely a state or the culmination of a procedure, implies an ongoing evaluative process involving our wills. Because we experience our will, we are constantly aware of what it is. When we are impinged upon by external forces or even compelled toward certain acts, we still know, at all times, what our true will consists of. Our will cannot be made wholly opaque to us by external means. I argue that this is a crucial component of autonomy. We cannot be acting on our will in the truest sense if we are not actively aware of what that will is. We do not know our wills merely by knowing practical reason; we know our wills because we experience them. To the rational agent, individual wills are deeply and unavoidably personal.

Kant says that neither experience nor empirical considerations can confirm our freedom. That does not imply that there is nothing substantive to say about being the kind of creatures who have this experience. He is right that such experience does not confirm freedom on the grander metaphysical conception. It is not necessary, however, that the will be fundamentally free in a comprehensive metaphysical sense for these experiences to be significant. It is this shared concept of experiential freedom that connects us as rational agents and that, on this view, makes moral accountability arguably just. Insofar as we all share at least the experience of being deliberators—of undergoing the process of making decisions in a way that feels sufficiently free from external determination—we can be held to a roughly equal moral standard.

Is Freedom Compatible with Determinism?

Finally, I want to argue that experiential freedom is compatible with determinism. On this view, freedom is relevantly a matter of experience, or of taking oneself to be free; it is not bound to physical considerations about the causal origin of the will. Because the notion is sufficiently abstract, it makes Kant’s concern to establish autonomy in a domain distinct from physical reality more attainable. Even if our wills are ultimately determined in some sense,¹ that fact has no bearing on our experience of our wills. Insofar as moral law is derived from experiential freedom, it is consistent—and therefore just—to formulate moral law on these grounds, since all agents who can be considered rational share this experiential freedom.